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Indicative planning in Spain (1964-1975) 
 
1. Introduction 
The practice of planning or government intervention dates back to the first planning attempts 
and introduction of the planning organism in the 1920 in the Soviet Union, and consequently putting 
into practice the first-five year development plan (DP). The “Plan Monnet” in France is considered the 
pioneer in introducing the concept and proper practice of the indicative planning (IP), with the purpose 
of reconstructing the economy damaged by II World War (Balassa, 1965). The rationale of the eco-
nomic planning was not only to anticipate and describe the developments of the French economy, but 
also to guide it to the attainment of the selected objectives (Alterman, 2001).  
After 1939, Spanish economic policy attempted to achieve economic self-sufficiency. This poli-
cy, largely imposed by Spain's position during World War II and the isolation to which Spain was 
subjected in the decade following 1945, was also favoured by Spanish political and business leaders. 
In 1959, following two decades of little or not overall growth, the Spanish government, acceding to 
reforms suggested by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), OECD, and BIRD and encouraged by 
the promise of foreign financial assistance, announced its acceptance of the Stabilization Plan, intend-
ed to curb domestic inflation and adverse foreign payment balances (Blakanoff, 1976). 
Inspired by the successfulness of French DP and its outstanding results achieved, Spain intro-
duced the practice of IP similar to those of France with the objective to raise the living standards of the 
Spanish people, encourage personal development and favour freedom and dignity of the person; and 
achieve a better distribution of the personal, sectorial and regional income as economic target (Meade, 
1970). The planning was viewed by Spanish economists as an important and indispensable instrument 
to help Spain to go deeper into the line of internal economic liberalization, and allow greater integra-
tion on the European and international scale. 
In 1962 a new department was created within the Office for Economic Coordination and Plan-
ning, the Commissariat for the Development Plan, which implemented three DP from 1964 to 1975. 
The DP have contributed in the evolution of the Spanish economy, allowed social transformations, 
increased rationality of the economic policy while establishing development objectives. At the same 
time the plans were not capable of restraining the inflationary tensions, neither correcting serious re-
gional imbalances, leading to the disordered urban growth and worsening the environment. Among the 
negative effects of the planning on the economy were the rigidity of the labour market, including low 
wages and concealed unemployment, as well as he increased dependency of the Spanish economy on 
the foreign financing, including remittance of emigrants, tourism and foreign capital. 
Long-range planning began with Spain’s first DP (1964-67), providing a total investment 
of $ 355 billion (Wrase, 1990). The second plan (1968-71) called for an investment of $ 553 billion, 
with an average annual growth of 5.5% in GNP. The third plan (1972-75) called for investments 
of $ 871 billion; drastic readjustments had to be made in 1975 to compensate for an economic slump 
brought on by increased petroleum costs, a tourist slowdown, and a surge in imports. A fourth plan 
(1976-79) focused on development of energy resources, with investments to increase annually by 9%. 
 
2. Historical antecedents of planning in Spain 
This section will expose in concise form the diverse approaches, planning experiences and at-
tempts that have taken place in Spain before the introduction of the DP in 1964. It describes the first 
antecedents of IP in the XVI-XVIII century and the antecedents in the XX century. Carrying out an 
investigation of the economic historiography of Spain before XX century there is little evidence of 
studies dedicated towards the analysis of the planning process that can be found in publications, 
speeches, and projects of the Spanish authors. Regardless of the limitation of qualified data there are 
several authors to be mentioned, including Miguel Alvarez Ossorio (1686), Bernardo Ward (1762), 
Pablo Olavide (1766), Gaspar Jovellanos (1795), and Francisco Cabarrus (1795), in whose works and 
publications appear the first allusions, though comparatively negligible, of introducing DP in Spain.  
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Miguel Alvarez Ossorio in his two petitions to Carlos II (both in 1686) proposes the implemen-
tation of DP as an effective method of resolving the problems that the economy of Spain was facing in 
the second half of the XVII century. Ossorio underlined that in the first place problems should be 
identified and analysed, than objectives and goals defined, and finally a series of action instruments 
should be established to make possible the attainment of the proposed goals. 
Bernardo Ward in his Proyecto económico (1762) devise the global development for the Span-
ish economy, emphasizing that the final point of the development is to achieve public happiness on the 
basis of increased wealth of a country through realizing the fundamental objective: deploying all the 
capacity of the trade and extending to the maximum exports to the American colonies. In order to 
achieve this objective it is crucial to develop a set of secondary objects and action instruments, as well 
as establishing a central organization for controlling and supervising the realization of the projected 
goals. Ward emphasized that the process of trade liberalization and development of the productive 
forces can be achieved through assimilation of European techniques and methods of production. 
Pablo Olavide, Gaspar Jovellanos and Francisco de Cabarrus can be hardly considered as ante-
cedents of DP; however it is worth mentioning that they developed a program of reforms for the agrar-
ian sector, establishing clear objectives and socio-economic measures for achieving those, contemplat-
ing agriculture as the core for the global development of Spain. 
At the beginning of the XX century, Pascual Carrion explicitly demonstrated the importance of 
IP. In two publications on “latifundios” and “reforma agraria” (1931) Carrion depicts the problems 
of Spanish agricultural sector, accentuating the large estates and concluding that there is a necessity of 
carrying out numerous reforms, which, “if realized successfully, will strengthen the Republic, elevate 
the economic and cultural level of the farmers and make possible the deep transformation of the prop-
erty, production and socio-economic regime tending towards the universal equality”. Moreover Carri-
on affirms that “one of the principal tasks of the rising Spanish Republic is to coordinate different 
branches of the national production, ensuring that the development is harmonic. And in order to obtain 
this objective it is precise to pay attention to the base of all production, which in case of Spain is agri-
culture. However not only producing more can contribute to the increase in wealth, but also assuring 
that these products are sold properly, that is to say, impelling the industries and the trade. It is essential 
to synchronize the efforts of farmers, industrialists, retailers and bankers” (Paniagua, 1975). Carrión 
elaborates a program of reforms, where, once the objectives are defined, a series of measures are de-
termined to achieve those, which are divided in “fundamentals” (the access to the land) and “indirect” 
(the fiscal system, national budget, industry, etc.), and finally establishing the plan for financing the 
project (Fuentes, 1964). 
In 1939 appears the first work that explicitly develops a global DP for Spain presented by FET y 
JONS, that without a doubt was carrying out imperative elements to be considered an important prece-
dent of the Spanish IP: the work proposed partial plans for all sectors of the national economy and 
specified that “all the regions, provinces, and cities have to act in response to the programs defined by 
the State”, which laid the base for the further creation of the Development Poles (“Polos de desarrol-
lo”) and the Poles of Industrial Promotion (“Polos de promoción industrial”) during the practice of the 
IP (Almodóvar; Cardoso, 2005). The work specifically underlined that “no national Plan will have true 
sense unless enumerated plans are considered simultaneously and harmonically and are integrated in a 
set oriented to the national program.” The primary objectives of the Plan were “material arrangement 
of Spain” and “equipping Spain with a structural organization of perfect operation.” The work speci-
fied the organizations that will be responsible for preparation, projection and execution of the Plan and 
stated clearly the functions that correspond to them. 
In 1953, Manuel de Torres, one of the most outstanding Spanish economists, retook the idea of 
planning in a tract: La coordinación de la política económica en España. Torres describes the prob-
lems and inefficiency of the Spanish economy and finds the cause of it in the inaptness of middle-term 
aims and the inconsistency between those, emphasizing the necessity of a better coordination between 
the objectives of the economic policy and the measures of action taken, stressing the need for the 
proper practice of rationalized planning for the Spanish economy. Torres advocates the creation of a 
central organism of planning and coordination, following the model of the Dutch Central Planning 
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Bureau, an organism of technical character, with primarily purpose of contributing to the general 
preparation of the economic policy: “drawing up of annual macro-economic previsions that would 
reduce uncertainty in the formulation of economic policy decisions and increasing the efficiency and 
coherence of the measures of action that were defined” (Ramos; Pires, 2009), instead of designing 
detailed projects, planning or fixing objectives. In 1957 Torres shaped the Office of Economic Plan-
ning and Coordination, which will be later on absorbed by Planning Commission. 
Inspired by the idea of coordination of the economic policy in 1954 the Institute of Political 
Studies, under the initiative of Valentín Andrés Álvarez, took the responsibility of elaborating Input-
Output Table, in order to have a global vision of the national economy and macro-economic descrip-
tion of the interrelationships in the system and which would serve as an instrument for Spanish econ-
omy planning in the sixties. The team in charge of the first Input-Output table was formed of Gloria 
Begu, Fernández Castañeda y Santos Blanco, with the further collaboration of Manuel de Torres.  
In the preface of Input-Output Table 1954, Manuel de Torres identified the crucial problem of 
the production bottlenecks in the industrial sectors, precisely the amplified necessity of imports of the 
minerals and raw materials due to the prompt development of chemical, mechanical, electrical and 
textile industries. Torres demonstrates the foreign dependency of the Spanish economy and votes 
against autarky and in favour of opening the economy. Using the data from Input-Output tables Torres 
considered that the promotion of exports can be more efficient than the substitution of imports, classi-
fying economic sectors as “exporters” and “importers”, calculating sectorial productivity by means of 
the quotient between value added and total output; building a performance scale for each sector. 
In 1958 a new work team was created under the direction of Torres with an aim of carrying out 
the applications from Input-Output Table 1954, as well as projections for the years 1955-1957. The 
new table “had greater detail, far more delineation (212 sectors instead of 32), and was supported by 
better statistical sources than that of 1954. In the 1960s, two more tables would be drawn up (one for 
the year 1962 and another for 1966)” (Ramos; Pires, 2009). 
Following the idea of the convenience of planning the economic development and accepting the 
“necessity of a coordinated policy”, demonstrated by Manuel de Torres, the Institute of Hispanic Cul-
ture in 1956 takes the responsibility to elaborate the guidelines for a possible long term DP (composed 
of three five-year plans) in the work Estudios Hispánicos de desarrollo económico, which is consid-
ered to be the closest and the most relevant antecedent of the IP in Spain in the sixties.  
Primarily the work emphasizes the goal of intensifying the Latin-American interchanges that 
can be achieved by accelerating a sufficient degree of the economic development in Spain: “increasing 
drastically the capacity of production, not only to stimulate the stable internal growth, but also to reach 
a greater volume of exports. However these objectives could never be obtained without IP and harmo-
nious growth of the different sectors of production. It is crucial to adopt planning techniques in a way 
that would increase the production in order to elevate the standard of living and welfare state of the 
population” (Paniagua, 1975). 
In the section Exposición preliminar various foreign experiences of IP are analysed, including 
Plan Monnet in France, Plan C.E.P.A.L. in Colombia, and Plan Vanoni in Italy, commending to apply 
foreign experiences where possible (Hatem, 1992). The same section examines the current perspec-
tives for the development of the Spanish economy, defining the most feasible area of growth and de-
sired National Product, as well as estimating the provisional capital-product ratio.  
Summarizing, they present a true plan of long term development, in elaboration of which used 
methods and techniques of IP, pushing forward the key aim of integrating Spanish economy with the 
world economy. 
 
3. Stabilization Plan (1959) and World Bank Report (1962) 
Indisputably the Spanish Stabilization plan of 1959 was the first step towards introducing the 
proper practice of IP and was in a way a guarantee for successful elaboration of the DP. The Stabiliza-
tion and Liberalization Plan was put into practice in 1959 as a complete economic reorientation policy 
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in order to prevent the collapse of the economy, which was characterized by financial instability, bal-
ance of payments difficulties, growing inflation, external debts; and carried two primarily objectives: 
the restoration of the financial stability and restraining inflation, as well as liberalizing foreign trade 
and encouraging inward investment. However many economists argue that the real purpose of the plan 
was “a continuation of the development process along with the greater integration into the internation-
al economy, starting with Europe” (Harrison, 1985). Under the direction of Joan Sardá, a group of 
economists together with the foreign technicians from IMF and OECD, elaborated a set of macroeco-
nomic policies and actions aimed at restoring and expanding the economy.  
The 1959 Stabilization and Liberalization Plan was a genuine success and marked the beginning 
of a “Golden Age” in the Spanish economy, characterized by rapid economic growth, the country en-
tered rapidly into a process of economic liberalization and international market integration, creating 
possibilities for future economic growth, as well as ended the period of autarky in Spain. The success 
of the plan increased “the prestige and social recognition of the Spanish economists as professionals 
capable of playing an important role in the orientation of public concerns became established. It was 
considered a fundamental asset for the drawing up of a “desired” development plan”. 
The World Bank report of 1962 on the economic development of Spain is widely considered to 
be the fundamental support for the adoption of IP practice in Spain in the beginning of sixties (Rojo, 
1963). In 1961 under the request of the Spanish tax Minister, Navarro Rubio, the International Bank 
for reconstruction and development, dispatched a mission to Spain, directed by Sir Hugh Ellis-Rees. 
The purpose of the mission was to conduct a global research of the economic conditions of Spain as 
well as possible future prospects for development, and “assist Spanish Administration in the prepara-
tion of a long-term development programme designed to expand and modernize the Spanish economy 
and thereby rise the standard of living of Spanish people while, at the same time, maintaining financial 
stability” (Harrison, 1985). The scope of the study included exhaustive analysis of the various sectors 
of the economy, including infrastructure, agriculture, transportation, etc., summarizing existing prob-
lems and recommending the right course of action for solving those.  
By 1962 an extensive detailed report, with the focus on planning combined with effective 
monetary and fiscal policy, was presented with noteworthy conclusions. In the first place the report 
stressed out the need for the discouragement of the restrictive practices, impelling a high rate of 
growth, maintaining the economic stability, obtaining an optimal use of savings, stimulation of the 
competition, and undoubtedly the progressive exposure of the Spanish economy to foreign competi-
tion. Also the report exposed the economic and social development differences between the Spanish 
provinces, accentuating on the urgent need of restoring the equal development of all regions. In the 
third place it affirmed favourable growth possibilities (forecasted 5 % of economic growth in the next 
decade) for the Spanish economy, insisting that “currently, the most appropriate kind of planning for 
Spain is that of “indicative planning”, but “the government must not try to plan each and every one of 
the aspects of national life” (Estrin; Holmes, 1990). The report represented the crucial support for 
elaboration and implementation of the first DP. Fabián Estapé (1963) in the critical essay on this Re-
port stated that it confirmed the outstanding possibilities for the economic growth without the necessi-
ty of substantially modifying the structure of the system through profound institutional reforms and 
without losing monetary stability”. The conclusions of the report were extremely appealing and played 
an exceptionally important role in the final decision of introducing IP in Spain. 
Again, OECD’s 1964 Economic Survey of Spain examined output and demand, the internal fi-
nancial situation, external transactions, and the DP 1964-1967 and drew a series of conclusions. 
 
4. The rationale for adopting the Development Plan in Spain 
France historically has always served as an example and important source of ideas and innova-
tions, as well as organizational and performance models for Spain. Taking into consideration the suc-
cess of the “Plan Monnet” in France, its international acceptance together with the noteworthy results 
achieved after the introduction of the IP, including stable, rapid rate of economic growth, sustained 
inflation, and rapid incorporation in the Common Market, for Spain it seemed logical to imitate the 
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established, fully developed and systemized scheme of DP, and adjust it for the Spanish economy. As 
underline Ramos and Pires (2009) “the adoption of planning approaches similar to those that dominat-
ed at that time on the European stage was a way to seek the comparison of the country to its neigh-
bours with regard to economic organization”. 
First and foremost the elaboration of a Program of Development of the Spanish economy took 
place under very specific circumstances. Primarily, the experience of the years prior to the introduc-
tion of the DP have shown clearly the necessity to prolong the operation of monetary stabilization, 
introduced in July 1959, by means of a systematic policy development. In that case DP was considered 
a logical continuation of the Stabilization Plan. And secondary, the decision to ask for the association 
to the Common Market required the establishment of the proper mechanisms so that the Spanish econ-
omy could confront the negative effects of the integration process and use thorough the opportunities 
of expansion that the European market offers (Marchal, 1965). As exposed in the article Esperanzas y 
problemas de la Planificación Española (ICE, 1962): “We cannot, in any case, pay for integration to 
Europe at the cost of the stagnation of the economy; on the contrary, integration has to contribute to its 
growth. Without an effective policy of internal development carefully elaborated and accurately exe-
cuted, the negative effects of integration on the Spanish economy would be disastrous, being able to 
take to a situation of a true economic sluggishness”. 
The official objective of the DP pursued as social target was to raise the living standards of the 
Spanish people, to encourage personal development and favour freedom and dignity of the person; and 
to achieve a better distribution of the personal, sectorial and regional income as economic target. 
However for the purpose of the present study it is precise to investigate for what DP were supposed to 
serve and which primary aims it was meant to achieve by introducing the proper practice of IP.  
In the first place it was believed that IP would discipline and rationalize the public sector, im-
prove the coordination and efficiency of the economic policy actions, and specify the structural and 
institutional obstacles to the development of the Spanish economy. “The plan had to be founded on a 
kind of large-scale market study for the entire economy, one in which all the sectorial interdependence 
effects were gathered, and with that information, it could be considered some realistic objectives, co-
herent amongst themselves, which would contribute to accelerating economic development, respecting 
the essential macro-economic balances” (Ramos; Pires, 2009). Furthermore, IP would improve the 
information available to the private sector. The private sector will have at its disposal reliable infor-
mation about the evolution of the demand, projected for the long-term period. This information would 
reduce uncertainty in decision-making and will have a great importance for the companies that try to 
make large scale investments and with a long period of maturation, since they would be capable to 
devise their particular investment forecasts with greater knowledge of the sectorial situation and from 
the general economic tendencies defined for the coming years.  
Also IP was supposed to motivate and direct the private sector in specific directions, as well as 
to incite the advances in production quality and quantity, together with the modernization of the 
equipment. DP would serve as an instrument for the anticipation and avoiding economic disequilibri-
um. The establishment of the accurate projections of imports was fundamental for the Spanish eco-
nomic development and gives a precise idea of expansion efforts of the exports imposed by a certain 
rate of internal growth. Another basic projection was the forecast of income and expenses of the Pub-
lic Sector, as the maintenance of the balance between two variables directly depends on the monetary 
equilibrium of the system (Comín, 1996). But also the study of the forecasts and perspectives by each 
sector can serve to avoid economic bottlenecks, as well as capacity excesses in various sectors.  
The major task of planning was to introduce order, coherence, and economic rationality in the 
heavy investment expenditure of the Public Sector and national companies. The investment program 
had inclination towards investments with long period of maturation and development of strategic or 
“key” sectors, including heavy industry, energy, roads, and capital goods. Also planning would serve 
as indispensable instrument for a more reasonable distribution of income, together with social im-
provements, including education, welfare services, housing. Special attention was devoted to the terri-
torial re-stabilization and “it was expected that the development would naturally accentuate territorial 
differences, tending to concentrate the population in specific geographical areas and to accentuate 
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rural exodus. All in all, specific measures were resorted to that in some way counteracted said tenden-
cies, such as the famous “promotion and development poles” would later be”.  
 
5. The critical reception of the Development Plan by economists 
The practice of the IP prior to its introduction in 1964 received for the most part positive eval-
uations and reviews from the Spanish as well as foreign economists. Very few economists expressed 
concern or direct critics about dangers and difficulties of the DP to be initiated. In fact it was viewed 
as an important, or even one would say, indispensable instrument to help Spain to go deeper into the 
line of internal economic liberalization, and allow greater integration on the European and internation-
al scale. Economists as Prados Arrarte, Juan Echevarría, Ramón Tamames, expressed forcefully the 
importance of introducing IP and the favourable results that can be achieved in the course of it.  
Prados Arrarte (1965) viewed the DP as an important step towards strong and stable economic 
policy, explaining that the imperfections in the plan occur due to the lack of experience in this type of 
planning together with the scarce data available. Juan Echevarría (1964) gave positive evaluation to 
the DP, concentrating on the weaknesses of plan that can possibly harm the future economic growth: 
sufficient lack of agrarian policy and social aspects of the development, “granted favourable treatment 
to the capital factor at the cost of labour, since to it all the incentives, advantages and exemptions were 
directed, as well as the breach between the investment forecasts and savings derived from a great de-
pendence on high, sustained indexes of foreign investment, taking into consideration the poor export-
ing behaviour that the Spanish economy in the preceding years, which did not invite hope of great 
improvements in this area”.  
Ramón Tamames (1964) praised IP, believing that it would mark “a fundamental milestone in 
the economic history”. Juan Echevarría underlined the main drawbacks of planning, including lack of 
social participation in the elaboration of DP, little attention devoted to education, inadequate role of 
foreign capital, and hasty regional development programme without a clear strategy. Moreover, Emilio 
De Figueroa (1964) underlined that the Plans would be successful if, and only if, they would take into 
consideration and intend to resolve by all means the three main obstacles that the Spanish economy 
was facing: lack of social mobility, lack of competition, and monetary instability.  
Della Porta (1964) exposed several critical observations of the Plan, mainly of technical charac-
ter: (a) The absence of a general model perplex the appraisal of the development and complicates the 
evaluation of the feasibility of the Plan, of the anticipated redistribution of the active population be-
tween the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors; the relative suitability of the Plan in respect with 
macro variables including increase in the productivity, the imports, and consumption; (b) The redun-
dancy of the proposals of the qualitative character, which do not indicate the way whereby the stated 
criteria can be quantified, especially in the matter of selection of the investments; (c) The information 
is incomplete on the certain subjects: the relation between the private consumption and the income 
available with its reflection on the formation of the individual saving; the relation between the wage 
increase and increases in the productivity; the price policy, in relation with the inevitable and forecast-
ed tensions that will occur as consequence of the increase in the demand of the home economy and 
exterior opening-up; (d) It is impossible to appraise the behaviour of the private sector before the in-
troduction of the Plan, neither the bond that allow the private actions to develop in agreement with the 
general objectives of the plan is indicated; (e) The technical and administrative periods of interven-
tions in relation to the period of performance of the Plan are not expressed, making it impossible to 
judge objectively the possibility of achieving the determined goals during four-year Plan. However 
despite of the ample critics of the DP and its underdeveloped technical aspects, Della Porta empha-
sized that the general objectives do not contradict each other and were totally compatible; the Plans 
presents a high degree of flexibility; the quantitative goals are fixed with prudence and, taking into 
account the process of liberalization in course of the Spanish economy, the projected targets have a 
great probability of being reached, if not in the first four years, but in the future six. 
The article Esperanzas y problemas de la planificación española (ICE, 1962) summarized the 
dangers of the Plan about to be introduced, stressing several drawbacks associated with it. Primarily 
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there was a concern that the Plan could become a formal substitute, instead of being an instrument, of 
the development politics. Secondary the DP could entail regression towards the markets of direct in-
tervention. Greater integration on European scale will require intense liberalization of the markets, 
increased flexibility of the production system, and full use of the free initiative of the entrepreneur. In 
case of indirect interventions the free game of supply and demand is respected, however if DP would 
involve direct intervention the balance would be damaged, and the objectives would not be accom-
plished. Thus for the success of the Plan it should be an instrument for liberalization of the markets. 
Thirdly, another danger that cannot be ignored, the elaboration of Plan could be drastically influenced 
by certain interest groups in the specific desired directions, thus swerving from the crucial objectives. 
Fourthly, in order for the Plan to succeed, it is precise to establish proper mechanisms to fight monop-
oly, which ignores innovation, slows down economic growth, and socially harmful. 
 
6. The process of elaboration of Development Plans in Spain 
Laureano López Rodó, Spanish lawyer, diplomat, politician and member of Opus Dei, played a 
leading role in the elaboration and executing of DP, which, have contributed decisively in the evolu-
tion of the Spanish economy. López Rodó (1963) believed that the DP could be a powerful catalyst of 
the Spanish Administrative reform. Commissioner for Economic and Social Planning, in Presidency of 
the Government of Spain, López Rodó stated trough the decree 94/1961 of February the 1st: “The ne-
cessity to impel the elaboration of the Plan of Economic Development and assure a more effective 
coordination of tasks, which correspond to ministerial departments, Trade Union and private initiative, 
advising to have an adequate instrument that serves as a connection between the Delegate Committees 
of economic matters and organisms that are to participate in the elaboration and later execution of the 
Plan” (Álvarez, 1975). As a result in 1962 the new department within the Office for Economic Coor-
dination and Planning was created: the Commissariat for the Development Plan (in 1973 renamed as 
Planning Ministry) under the direction of López Rodó, who became commander-in-chief of the regime 
economic forces.  
The objective of the Commission was to transform the Spanish economy, improving the stand-
ards of life, modernizing productive structures, planning the growth of the different economic sectors, 
reducing regional imbalances and promoting the development of specific regions (Domínguez, 2002). 
The Commission played a vital role in coordinating the medium-term decisions, including annual 
planning for public expense devoted to investment to give greater rationality to the decisions; as well 
as guiding the private initiative in its expense decisions, affecting its actions by means of investment 
incentives. 
The decantation of the scheme of the Plan on planning the actions to be implemented took sev-
eral months for various teams under the direction of Lopez Rodó. J. R. Álvarez Rendueles (Sub-
Secretary of Finance) stressed the four principal phases of the elaboration of each plan, emphasizing 
that despite its peculiarities all plans followed the same model or scheme.  
The first phase included studies on evolution of the population, productivity and economic 
magnitudes prepared by the Cabinet of Studies and various commissions (which also included gov-
ernment attorneys and national advisors) and offices (González, 1979). The teams drew a picture of 
each specific sector including the proper measures to be adapted for achieving the objectives in four 
years. It is important to mention that the preparation of the DP by Commissariat was leaned on the 
work of the vertical and horizontal commissions, such as Foreign Commerce or Financing. During this 
stage of preparation of DP the Commissariat turned to the advice of foreign organizations and experts. 
The I DP was based on the report elaborated by the World Bank, which summarized existing problems 
and proposed feasible solutions, as well as logical strategies to follow. The report of the World Bank 
laid the foundations for the further construction of the Plan. The II and III DP received technical assis-
tance through the works of foreign experts, including Kragh, Beckerman, Thorbeck, Richardson and 
Waterston. For the II DP foreign specialists recommended financial planning, foreign commerce pro-
jections, selectivity, whereas the III DP benefited through the suggestion of introducing econometric 
model into the operation, as well as short and medium-term forecasts.  
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The second phase is the planning itself. The Commissariat prepared the diverse alternatives of 
the possible behaviour of the economy in micro and macro-terms and elaborated the corresponding 
forecasts of production, investment, employment, foreign commerce for different sectors.  
The third phase, more of the political character, included stating the final directives for the Plan. 
During this stage the scope of participation of the Spanish population was extended inside the schemes 
previously drawn up, and the reports from different organisms were collected. Finally, the Commis-
sioner of the Plan, Lopez Rodó, presented the Plan to the Government, for the approval of the objec-
tives, alternatives of growth and projected performance of the economy for next four years.  
After the approval of the DP the Commissariat elaborates the final draft of the Plan. At this final 
stage the great importance play the determination of the proper program of the public investments 
through the collaboration with the Ministry of Finance and Treasury, which in its turn develops finan-
cial planning, which is carried out by the finance presentation, guided by the Central Bank.  
Once all the phases of the elaboration of the Development Plan are completed, the plans are 
prepared to be approved by the Parliament. The Trade Union and the Council of the National Econo-
my after throughout examination of the proposed plan issue respective mandatory reports. With these 
proceedings, and along with the Law for the plan, the Government finally sent the plan to the Parlia-
ment for the study and definitive approval. 
 
7. Economic and social development program for Spain, 1964-1967 (I DP) 
The first DP (1964-1967) was started by the Spanish dictatorial government and promoted by 
the Industry and the third sector of the economy. It pursued to boost the resources of the Spanish 
economy after the long period of reconstruction and inflation in the 50s. The DP was viewed as the 
most logical alternative to the practice of economic improvisation, which can notably stimulate the 
development and progress of the country. Before the approval of the Plan in 1963 Franco stated that 
“the government politics has not only to anticipate the future”. López Rodó in the speech before the 
Parliament on the 27th of December of 1963 stated that: “The plan consists of: a forecast of the evolu-
tion of magnitudes of the Spanish economy in the next four years; a clear definition of the of the eco-
nomic and social development policy, that the Government suggests to follow; a program of public 
investments; a set of sectorial programmes assembled within general framework; a law that approves 
the Plan and assures its fulfilment” (Álvarez, 1975). 
The DP presented a general study of the economy with strong emphasis on industrialization and 
with the objective to achieve the maximum growth of the Gross National Product (Viñas, 1979). It 
also pursued a number of economic targets. First of all, it was precise to promote scientific and tech-
nical investigation; improve the transport sector; promote more equitable distribution of income that 
stimulates production; also increasing productivity in the agrarian sector would allow a greater supply. 
The Plan attempted to orientate and motivate the privates sector, which served to mobilize fundamen-
tal productive sectors of the country. The scheme of concerted action (“acción concertada”) was a 
copy of the French mechanism of “quasi contracts” between private sector and the State. The individ-
ual firms through a negotiation process with the Ministry of Agriculture, Interior and Industry took the 
responsibility of achieving a certain target of production or productivity. The State on its behalf was 
guaranteeing financial and fiscal rewards for accomplishing the stated objectives. In many cases the 
support included cheap credit, which was covering around 70 % of the cost of new plant or equipment 
(Harrison, 1985). Among the favoured industries were iron and ship-building, while other sectors like 
food processing were less favoured. 
The idea lying behind the scheme was the neoclassical conception of the World Bank Report 
(1962). The economic development of Spain had a great influence on the policy of regional develop-
ment. The Plan established the regional development policy to attract private initiative to the selected 
zones by the means of subsidies and fiscal incentives, with the purpose of restoring fairness in the 
development and income of various regions. Thus the Spanish regions were classified as “desarrolla-
das” or developed (North regions, Cataluña, Levante, and Balearic Islands); and “insuficientemente 
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desarrolladas” or less developed (Galicia, Duero and Ebro’s valleys, the Central regions, Andalucía 
and Canary Islands).  
There were created Areas of Development (“Polos de Desarrollo”) and Areas of Industrial Pro-
motion (“Polos de Promoción Industrial”). The Areas of Development were located in zones of low 
level of income, depending on the agriculture and with a high level of emigration, but in which al-
ready existed important industrial activity and possibilities for future growth. They included five cit-
ies: Zaragoza, Valladolid, Vigo, La Coruña and Sevilla. On contrary, the Areas of Industrial Promo-
tion were located in zones with important natural and humans resources, but with undeveloped indus-
trial activity. The regions with great possibilities of industrial development were supposed to initiate 
an industrialization process if the Government promotes it. Burgos and Huelva were chosen as Areas 
of Industrial Promotion. The activities to which benefits could be allocated were delimited in the Are-
as of Promotion, as it was in the case of Burgos, those activities were granted, that contributed to the 
development of the zone, as long as the investment needed was superior to the twenty million pesetas 
and at least fifty new working places were created. The regional action was mainly centred on the use 
of “growth areas”, that were able to improve the economic structures of lagging regions. 
The I DP announced a number of objectives to achieve in each sector during the following four 
years. Thus, in the agrarian sector the targets were: (1) Elevate the agrarian productivity in order to 
increase national supply, contribute to the economic and social development, as well as improve the 
balance of payments (2) Improve the conditions and standard of life in the country; (3) Facilitate the 
transfer of agrarian population to the other sectors; (4) Prepare agriculture for the integration of Spain 
in the EU (Prados, 1996). In order to reach those objectives the Plan proposed to accomplish: the re-
form of the agrarian structure; transformation, industrialization and commercialization of the agrarian 
products; adequate politics of agrarian prices to motivate the production; public and fiscal investment 
politics that contribute to the capitalization of agriculture.  
In the industrial sector, the high-priority objective was to increase productivity, which will have 
a positive effect on the competitiveness of the companies. The expansion of the sector was left to the 
private initiative. The public sector will intervene through the national Companies, as subsidiary in-
strument for the private initiative and by indirect methods. Among the objectives for the industry 
were: the promotion of the quality of products; the sufficient promotion of production units and distri-
bution. The instruments for achieving the targets include: concession of credits through ICO for long 
and medium term; promotion of the external investment, promotion of investments in the mining sec-
tor, policy of concentration of the productive units, policy of development and transformation of the 
small and medium company through technical and financial aid.  
According to the DP the transport sector was considered of major importance judging by the 
volume of investments assigned to it. The Plan recognizes the deficit in which the sector finds itself, 
and stresses the insufficiency of resources to correct it. On the basis of the previsions of the demand, 
the Plan states the objectives: achieve the maximum yield of the present resources, and effectively 
provide different means of transport with the objective to meet the demand resulting from the devel-
opment of the productive sectors. Finally, the Tourism Sector received a special attention in a country 
with millions of tourists. The plan was to increase the number of hotels and tourist lodgings; improve 
and increase the number of complimentary tourist infrastructure, including restaurants and travel 
agencies, and devote special attention to the professional formation. 
 
Real GNP increased 6.2 % in 1964-1968, instead of the 6 % projected. However, a deficit trade 
has been reported and growing in Spain the four years of the I DP, despite the favourable evolution of 
the balance of transferences. The net capital inflows, as it was anticipated, remarkably helped to fi-
nance the economic development. Despite this sustainable growth, economic stability was not 
achieved. The high inflation, which constituted in 1964, 8.6 % annual growth, lead to the high in-
crease in the prices of consumption, and forced to introduce stabilizing measures, which resulted in the 
devaluation of the peseta in 1967 (1 dollar equalled 70 pesetas). As for the industrial and construction 
sector achieved better results that was forecasted. The service sector also had positive evolution with 
the level of growth growing slightly over the predicted rate. On the contrary, the negative evolution in 
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the development of the fishing and agrarian sector, since the main investments made to this sector 
would have effects on the production only in the long term. The achieved results for the public sector 
did not accomplish 50 % of what was projected. Actual integration in the world economy was 
achieved through strong increases of imports and exports, and the boost of the tourism. 
 
8. The II DP (1968-1971) 
Selectivity was the feature that probably distinguished the II DP (1968-1971). It tried to im-
prove the allocation of resources, and assure the competitiveness the Spanish economy, as opposed to 
the general mobilization of resources and efforts in the I DP. Increased attention was paid to agrarian 
sector and education. The initiation of the Plan was delayed by almost a year due to the devaluation of 
the peseta in 1967 and innovations introduced in the legislative system of the Parliament through the 
constitutional reforms of the Organic Law of the State, on 1967 January the 10th. The II DP intended 
to be a “realistic plan” with three important characteristics: 1) Economic stability, as a consequence of 
the devaluation of peseta. The projected growth of the GNP was reduced to 5.5 %. 2) Increased atten-
tion to the development of the social sector, including strengthening education and professional for-
mation, raising the individual and social level of culture, promoting the equality of opportunities. Spe-
cial attention was devoted to the expansion of the Social security, healthcare and social assistance. The 
Plan guaranteed to meet the needs of the Spanish people, assuring sufficient medical assistance and the 
welfare services. 3) The third feature of the DP presented by Lopez Rodó before the Parliament: “Our 
country must strengthen the contacts with the international activity and make an effort to collaborate 
in its goals and participate in its success. For that reason, in the forecasts of the plan can be found in-
tentions to make the necessary efforts to connect with the Common Market, which will integrate the 
country into the social and economic progress of our continent” (Álvarez, 1975).  
Certainly, the II DP benefited from acquired technical improvements from the previous one. 
There was a significant advance in the forecasts of the macro-magnitudes, complemented with estima-
tion in monetary terms and a financial programming at elementary level. The preoccupation for the 
short-term progress and the introduction of necessary readjustments, lead to the configuration of the 
“alert signals” (a French concept), with divulging intentions and of mere control, to serve as an aid to 
the technicians in charge of monitoring the execution of the plan. 
The regional development objective in the II DP was to maintain the elevation of the rate of na-
tional growth, to shorten the gap among regions in terms of income per person. The Plan affirmed: 
“The persistence of regional imbalances and the socio-economic transformations in the last years ad-
vise to continue the policy of regional development, framing the difficulties in a more ample concep-
tion”. The long-term regional development was defined by the rearrangement of the coastal zones, the 
aid was provided to foster economic progress of Ebro Valley, decongestion of Madrid and the union 
of Northern areas with Madrid through Burgos and Valladolid. The Poles of Zaragoza, Seville and 
Valladolid were replaced in 1970 by those of Granada, Córdoba and Oviedo. The Plan rested on the 
concept of “development axes”, rather than the “precise” concept of regional planning. And intended 
to extend the sphere of action, including agrarian policy (agrarian industrialization, colonization, rural 
arrangement), industrial policy (regions of preferred industrial location, industrial estates, deconges-
tion of highly industrialized regions clearing), and the sector services. 
 
9. Objectives and results of the II DP  
In the primary sector the objective was to elevate the population’s standards of life, improving 
the distribution of income in favour of the agriculture, and increasing agricultural production in order 
to obtain a greater internal supply in satisfactory conditions of quality and price. Thus internal con-
sumption would increase and commercial balance will be possible. The Plan fixed various targets: 
education and professional formation; technical training in agrarian companies; developing the con-
servation, transformation and commercialization of the agrarian products; adequate price policy to 
strengthen production; selective policy of public investment and stimulation of the private investment; 
credit policy to the agrarian companies that fulfil certain announced requirements. 
 11
The II DP intended to foster production efficiency of the industrial sector, which would allow 
Spanish industries to meet the internal market conditions of price and quality and expand exports. The 
recommended policies were: intensification of the process of industrial concentration; expansion of the 
production of those sectors that have the greatest possibilities of export, or replacement of imports in 
competitive conditions; improvement of the financial structure of the companies; update, simplify and 
coordinate the norms and regulations that control the exercise of the industrial activity.  
The Plan recognized the need of rising the investment in the transport sector in order to satisfy 
the increased demand; and proposed the following objectives to achieve: to respond qualitatively to 
the increasing demand of transport and communications; more rational use of the transport infrastruc-
ture; to expand the activity of all means of transport, avoiding economic deviations, adapting the post-
al service and telecommunications to the new demand. To reach those objectives it was necessary to 
modernize the structures and techniques of distribution; promote greater competition; establish the 
standardization of products for the domestic market; set up information systems of amounts and prices 
for industrial products on national scale; impel the technical assistance to the traders, as well as inves-
tigation and study of the problems of the domestic trade. Finally, in the Tourism sector the Plan pro-
moted domestic and foreign tourism and greater diversification of the demand and the tourist zones. 
During the course of the II DP the external stability recovered however it was not fully 
achieved. Despite of the fact that the price levels were reduced considerably, they still remained supe-
rior to the levels projected. The achieved rate of 6.5 % annual growth of the GNP surpassed the pro-
jected growth by one percentage point. During those years it was possible a considerable improvement 
in the balance of goods and services, as well as a significant increase of foreign trade coverage. The 
capital balance grew gradually in the long term, presenting a lower inflow of capital than projected. 
The negative evolution of the capital formation, especially in 1970-71, resulted in the improvement of 
the external stability.  
The rate of growth of the industrial sector was superior to the planned one. The construction 
sector experienced ups and downs during the course of the plan, showing excellent results in 1968 and 
1969, and major decline in 1970 and 1971. As for the agrarian and service sector they showed a posi-
tive evolution (especially in 1971) with a high rate of growth. The disagreement between short and 
long term policies remained and the “alert signals” were not taken care of by those responsible for it. 
By the end of 1971 the prognosis was very optimistic and all the major economic indicators were 
demonstrating favourable evolution. That was the reason to maintain the parity of peseta, despite the 
international monetary fluctuations of December 1971. 
 
10. The Third Development Plan (1972-1975) 
The III DP is considered to be the most expansive one, with the projected annual growth of the 
Gross National Product of 7 % in real terms. In order to obtain a high sustained growth of the GNP the 
priority was given to the industrial sector, rather than to agricultural or service sectors. The target was 
to make it possible the integration with the Common Market. Although the III DP presented some 
technical improvements, the fluctuations in the international monetary system and the elevation of the 
petroleum prices, prevented a positive repercussion in the Spanish economy. It was given attention to 
some aspects: to regionalize public investment; to solve the problem of degradation of the environ-
ment, which became severe in certain zones; and to achieve that each region had essential means to 
impel and to accelerate its own development. 
The III DP gave priority to the social development rather than economical one, in order to reach 
a better quality of life for the Spanish people: healthcare and social attendance, employment and social 
security, a fair assignment of resources. The planners focused on improving the use of the resources 
available and increasing investment participation, at the cost of restraining the progress in the private 
consumption. In this sense, the Plan leaved the allocation of decisions to the market, making it the 
principal decision-making mechanism. The use of econometric models enriched the planning tech-
niques, for the medium and long-term planning, as well as for the sectorial approach.  
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11. Objectives for the different economic sectors  
In agriculture the III DP aimed to promote a greater standard of life of the sector, strengthening 
the production to obtain a greater degree of self-sufficiency in good conditions of quality and price; so 
that there would produce an increase of exports. The instruments proposed in the Plan to achieve those 
objectives were: education, professional formation and the agrarian extension; applied investigation; 
expansion of advising assistance of technical and economical character; reforms of the socio-economic 
structure so that exports respond to the principles of social justice and profitability; improvements in 
agrarian infrastructure; improvement of the conservation, transformation and commercialization of 
agrarian products; credit policy; cultural and social promotion of farmers; maintenance of the stability 
of permanent agrarian workers, with the flexibility necessary to obtain improvements of the productiv-
ity of the sector; reorganization of the agrarian companies.  
The accelerated development of the industrial sector planned in III DP is justified by its pivotal 
role in the growth of GNP and, related with that fact, its increasing participation in the percentage of 
occupied population, the importance in foreign trade, and the necessity to prepare Spanish economy 
for integration in the Common Market. The chief objectives were: to reach a stable growth of industri-
al production to guarantee a sustained development of national income and social progress; and to 
achieve improvements in the competitiveness of the industry. The Plan accentuated the role of a few 
industrial sectors: basic industry (energy, iron, and steel), industries related to the advantage of natural 
resources (mining), and advanced technology industries. Basic industries, as a result of their foreign 
exchange earnings, create new incomes and additional spending power in the country’s economy. 
The III DP pointed out the increased demand that the Transport Sector was experiencing as a re-
sult of the development process. Among the primarily objectives were the further improvements and 
expansion of the transport system, as well as integration of the transport subsystems into a global one. 
In domestic trade the aim was to foster commercial structures especially in distribution of products in 
order to facilitate the connection between the production and consumption, reducing costs and easing 
the competition; facilitate the access to small / medium companies to higher levels of productivity; and 
the protection of the consumer rights. 
Finally, the tourism sector should continue the process of expansion, diversification, and im-
provement in the quality of service. The following objectives were selected as primarily ones: the ad-
justment of infrastructures to the supply of tourist lodgings; the promotion of hotels and domestic 
tourism; the creation of new tourism facilities. 
 
In the III DP there was a 6 % of GNP growth, instead of the planned 7 %. The high inflation 
surpassed the rates of the previous Plans. Also the external stability underwent an important deteriora-
tion. The trade balance deficit resulted in the considerable growth of the imports, and exports grew in 
a much smaller proportion, below the predicted rate. None sector reached the projected objectives. The 
smaller deviations took place in the agrarian and service sectors. The industrial sector did not achieve 
the predicted rates. The growth of the construction sector was weak, being even inferior to the one of 
the II DP. The prices rose dramatically in all the sectors, more than in the previous periods. The prices 
of the construction and services sectors had a greater growth, followed by the industrial and agrarian 
sectors. Inflation and deficits of the trade balance were of such consideration that demanded an imme-
diate solution. It is necessary to consider that the increase of petroleum prices had important negative 
effects in the domestic prices and the trade balance. 
 
12. Evaluation of the indicative planning in Spain  
Among the positive aspects, it can be said that DP contributed significantly in the evolution of 
the Spanish economy. The projected targets of annual growth of the GNP were surpassed in almost all 
Plans (I DP: projected growth was established at 6 % versus achieved 6,2 %; II DP: projected growth 
of 5,5 % versus achieved 6,5 %; III DP: estimated growth of 7 %, though not achieved, but the stable 
6 % of annual growth was accomplished). Without a doubt it is possible to ascertain that IP coincided 
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with the rapid expansion of the economy and most certainly contributed to it. It is worth mentioning 
that the new innovative strategies and techniques introduced during the course of the planning practice 
played a significant role in the progress achieved: “there is no doubt that joint efforts like stimulating 
the private investment thorough various incentives, the dynamics of public investment in the first 
years of planning, the collaboration  and trust of the private sector, and the increasing integration in 
the world market have contributed drastically to the rapid growth of the economy” (Álvarez, 1975). 
The second positive feature is that DP allowed positive economic and social transformations. 
The transfer of population from agriculture to the industry and the service sector lead to a drastic re-
duction of the agrarian population and remarkable growth of the population dedicated to industry and 
services. It increased the middle-class, including skilled workers, independent professionals, and em-
ployees of the administration, bank, and insurance. This change was reflected in the growth of the 
productive system, resulting in the increased investment quote in the GNP (Lieberman, 1995). The 
intense process of industrialization increased the production of cars or naval construction, as well as 
electric energy, which tripled during the course of the plans. The new social structure demanded 
changes in the education. Reforms introduced more technical and modern education, extending the 
compulsory schooling from 6 to 14 years (1964). The number of scholarships, institutes and universi-
ties was increased. The General Law of Education of 1970 introduced free elementary education. Con-
sequently, the illiteracy drastically diminished until reaching the levels of advanced countries. Im-
proved infrastructure and access to the consumption goods, resolved housing problem, all of these are 
the evidence that IP contributed to the transformation of the Spanish society.  
The third positive aspect is that IP contributed to the increased rationality of the economic poli-
cy while establishing development objectives. As in the case of the public sector, planning the invest-
ment projects lead to a greater rationality and broader vision in the decision making, allowing more 
sufficient and proper allocation of the resources. 
Oliva and others have emphasised some negative effects of the IP. First of all, DP missed the 
point, not resolving the crucial problems, but dedicating too many efforts to diversify the sectorial 
actions. Besides, the public sector didn’t complete its part in the implementation of the projected plan. 
The weakness and inefficiency of the public sector, with a regressive tax system, did not restrain the 
inflationary tensions, neither corrected serious regional imbalances, leading to the disordered urban 
growth and worsening the environment. 
Also, the existence of unnecessary mechanisms of protection and regulation to promote the en-
terprise activity, including credit preferences, special discount lines, fiscal exemptions, allowances, 
caused the fight between the different groups of interest of the regime, not for the reduction of produc-
tion costs or increases of productivity, but for obtaining certain privileges and financial aids. Another 
negative aspect was the rigidity of labour market, including low wages and concealed unemployment. 
The strict legislation prevented the dismissal of workers at the cost of maintaining low salaries and the 
lack of labour union freedom. Despite of a reduced rate of feminine activity, near a million workers 
was unable to find a job in the country. The exclusion of women from the labour market and the mas-
sive emigration of the Spanish workers to the European countries, including France, Germany, and 
Belgium, allowed keeping the rate of unemployment reduced.  
The work of the Commissariat of the Plan was relatively static during its years of existence, 
with regard to the conception and elaboration of the plans. With a reduced budget and limited person-
nel, the Commissariat couldn’t progress and become the real centre of studying and planning in order 
to realize meticulous global planning, as well as more solid and detailed sectorial planning.  
 
13. Conclusions  
It goes without saying that Spanish DP were largely influenced by the French experience of IP. 
Inspired by a great success of planning in France and excellent results achieved, Spain copied the 
model without readjustments for the domestic economy, hoping for similar outstanding outcomes. The 
French influence was especially noticeable in the organizational scheme of the Commissariat of the 
Plan, as well as in the structuring of the interrelations between it and the Administration and the pri-
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vate sector. However, the Spanish planning did not provide as good results as French, and can be 
evaluated merely as a failure, rather than success. Public and private sectors formed their decisions 
outside the purview of the targets established by a plan.  
As a result a radical difference between forecasts and reality was registered, without the plan-
ners making no attempts to review the forecasts or settle down complementary mechanisms. It is also 
worth mentioning that in the Spanish practice of IP, as opposed to the French one, the partial plans, 
the urgent measures and short term planning predominated over medium / long term planning, devot-
ing high-priority attention to the quantitative growth to the detriment of the structural transformations.  
It is difficult to conclude what the Spanish economy would have been without the DP. Many 
economists believe that a high rate of growth and eventual integration in the Common Market could 
have been achieved even without IP, arguing that “Spanish Miracle” had little to do with the practice 
of the development plans, stressing that they were nothing more than a waste of resources and gave 
rise to the increased complexity in the decision making both of the private and public sectors, and 
represented a serious obstacle to the positive tendency of the liberalization.  
DP coincided with the “Golden Age” of European growth (1950-73), characterized by high un-
interrupted rates of growth (real GDP annual growth exceeding 4 per cent in Western Europe during 
the stated period), mild cyclical fluctuations, moderate rates of inflation, important increases in the 
capital-output ratio, and low unemployment rates. The growth of European economy was associated 
with scientific and technological advances (massive transfer of technology from the United States), 
and as a result strong growth in fixed investment in machinery and equipment; reallocation of produc-
tion factors towards higher value-added sectors (from agricultural sector to modern manufactures); 
significant growth in the world and inter-European trade (due to the reduced tariffs), creation of a set 
of domestic and international institutional arrangements to promote openness and the integration of the 
European economies, including Marshall Plan, European Payments Union, European Free Trade Or-
ganization (1960), OECD, GATT, a system of fixed exchange rates, and the European Economic 
Community. Taking into consideration the favourable international environment and positive growth 
dynamics in Europe most probably the Spanish economy would have prospered without the DP.  
However it would be unfair not to consider that development plans introduced major improve-
ments, including improved educational and healthcare systems, positive social and cultural transfor-
mations, contributed to the increased rationality of the economic policy, and greater opening of the 
economy, despite of the significant deviations in the planning strategy. 
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